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Essay 
Response to the Contributors 
RICHARD S. KAY 
In this Essay, I respond briefly to 18 articles contributed to this special 
Festschrift issue of the Connecticut Law Review. All but one of the contributions 
fall within two categories: constitutional change and constitutional interpretation. 
These topics have engaged me for most of my career as a legal scholar. While 
every one of the contributions sheds new and useful light on these subjects, I 
usually have some differences with the interpretations argued in them. Of course, I 
can only treat those differences superficially here. In each case, moreover, my 
comments should not obscure my sincere admiration of and appreciation for the 
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Response to the Contributors 
RICHARD S. KAY * 
INTRODUCTION 
I am both honored and humbled by the publication of this Symposium. 
Every scholar hopes that something that he or she has produced will strike 
colleagues as clarifying or helpful in some way. It is rare, however, for the 
fulfilment of that hope to be demonstrated so clearly as has been the case 
with the publication of these thoughtful essays. It is difficult adequately to 
express what this publication has meant to me. 
I wish to thank the people who have been responsible for the 
organization and execution of this issue as well as for the extraordinary 
conference in September 2019, in which most of the contributors 
participated. Yaniv Roznai, who conceived the project and has effectively 
managed it, is at the top of that list. It is of special satisfaction to me that 
Yaniv, whose interests overlap so substantially with mine, and who is one 
of our brightest young scholars in comparative constitutionalism, thought 
my work worthy of his efforts. This undertaking was facilitated and 
supported by the University of Connecticut School of Law, and for that I 
am grateful to then-Dean Timothy Fisher, Peter Siegelman and Leslie 
Levin. Last year’s conference was superbly administered by Deborah 
King. I am also indebted to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, and 
especially to its Managing Editor, Adam Kuegler, for agreeing to the 
publication and for their work in producing it. 
Naturally, the substantive comments I offer here can only begin to 
engage the astute and stimulating essays of these accomplished friends and 
colleagues. I know they will understand, as is always the case in exchanges 
like this, that my observations mostly reflect my differences rather than my 
agreement with the positions they take. In each case, however, I admire the 
contributions and I am sincerely grateful for every one of them.1 
While they show considerable variety, almost all the articles in the 
Symposium fall into one of two broad and related categories, constitutional 
                                                                                                                     
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law Emeritus, and Oliver Ellsworth Research Professor, 
University of Connecticut School of Law. 
1 The limited time I have had to compose this response has necessarily reduced the independent 
research I have been able to undertake. I have, therefore, only provided citations to direct quotations. 
Quotations without citations are taken from the articles on which I am commenting. Since my 
Comments were based on preliminary drafts, there will doubtless be places where they do not reflect 
the final version. My apologies to the authors and to readers. 
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change and constitutional interpretation. These topics encompass most of 
the questions to which I have directed attention over many years. 
 Carol Weisbrod’s contribution does not fit easily under either topic. It 
deals with a broader theme, the scope of legal education and legal 
scholarship. Her essay reminded me of some of the significant changes that 
I have observed in the legal academy in the course of my career. I joined 
the University of Connecticut faculty in 1974, a time of growing prosperity 
for American law schools. In contrast, arts and sciences faculties, and 
especially humanities departments at that time, were tightening their belts. 
Graduate programs in those fields were producing more candidates than 
the shrinking market could accommodate, a tendency further encouraged 
by policies of the Selective Service System which was deferring 
conscription of full-time students. The result was a surplus of new Ph.D.’s 
in subjects like English, History, or Philosophy. What were these 
well-educated and scholarly inclined men and women to do? Many of them 
went to law school and when they were graduated, they saw an opportunity 
to redirect their thwarted academic ambitions to faculties in the relatively 
prosperous law schools.  
For some people, the arrival of these scholars explains the broadened 
fields of study still pursued in law faculties. Today, it is an unusual law 
school that doesn’t include scholars who are best described as historians, 
economists, or philosophers, not to mention the odd poet and novelist. It is 
generally assumed that these multidisciplinary endeavors marked a change 
from the 1950s and 60s, a time when legal scholarship was more 
concerned with practical questions of legal doctrine and judicial behavior. 
In fact, as Weisbrod shows, law faculties were never as insular as all that. 
The law exists in an intellectual web that connects with every kind of 
social science. The problems of understanding law, moreover, have always 
engaged with the techniques and perspectives of the humanities. Weisbrod 
reviews a particularly poignant moment in the association of law and the 
humanities at Harvard Law School at the turn of the twentieth century, one 
that reflected the influence of the culture of Boston “Brahmins.”  
Harvard president, Charles Eliot, expected that the “faculty of law will 
have very slight connection with any other faculty” and Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr. opined that the “law is not the place for the artist or the poet.” 
Still, Weisbrod shows that men like Harvard professors James Bradley 
Thayer and John Chipman Gray were “scholars and generalists apart from 
their contributions to . . . the severely practical private law curriculum.” 
Their wider interests, moreover, were not private avocations; they 
influenced their writing, teaching and, necessarily, their students. In an 
introductory lecture, Thayer urged new law students to maintain their 
“interest in literature, or the ancient classics, or natural science, or politics 
or art, or poetry.” A publication of Thayer’s shows him arbitrating a debate 
about Matthew Arnold’s criticism of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Samuel 
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Williston remembered Gray epitomizing “the old ideal of a rounded life . . 
. a well-read scholar in various fields with cultivated interests in letters and 
art.” 
This may be a particularly appropriate moment to keep in mind the 
essential entanglement of humanities and legal education. We now appear 
to be entering another period in which law schools are more actively 
pursuing “severely practical” ambitions. The era of “law and . . .” studies 
may not be coming to an end, but those programs will have to make room 
for “experiential” courses aimed at providing students with something 
more “hands on” than legal history or law and literature. This pressure is 
being driven by the requirements of employers, both individually and as 
represented in professional associations. The same interests are reflected in 
the preferences of law school applicants, something much more important 
at a time when competition for students is more intense. It is no 
disparagement of the value of such practical education, however, to believe 
that law cannot fully be understood if it is severed from the larger cultural 
environment of which it is a part. Weisbrod notes the Wallace Stevens 
Professorship, which it has been my honor to hold at the University of 
Connecticut. Stevens may have publicly scoffed at any supposed 
connection between law and poetry, but the fact is that his writing, like law 
itself, is preoccupied with the human need to impose form on formless 
reality—the “[b]lessed rage for order.”2 And, as long as the legal academy 
remains the site for thoughtful consideration of law and legal institutions, 
we can expect law faculties to continue to explore them through the lenses 
of the social sciences and the humanities. 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
The essays that deal with the identification and evaluation of 
constitutional change all engage a critical distinction. Some constitutional 
changes, including most constitutional amendments, are accomplished 
under a pre-existing authorization. But other kinds of change, such as 
revolutions or constitutional replacements must be effected with extra-legal 
actions. Many of the contributions to the Symposium grapple with the 
character of the latter, that is, with the nature of “constituent power.” Most 
of the thinkers who have attempted to describe this power have seen it as 
antecedent to positive law and, therefore, as something that cannot be 
controlled or limited by such positive law. This phenomenon and its 
attributes are often associated with the argument about the power of “the 
nation” made by the French revolutionary statesman, Emmanuel Joseph 
Sieyès in his What is the Third Estate? Sieyès described that power as “the 
                                                                                                                     
2 WALLACE STEVENS, The Idea of Order at Key West, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: 
SELECTED POEMS AND A PLAY 97, 98 (1971). 
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source and supreme master of positive law,” existing “independently of 
any rule and any constitutional form.”3 
In his contribution, Mikolaj Barczentewicz defines several new 
categories of actions that accomplish or contribute to constitutional 
changes of various kinds. In his view, for example, there are two types of 
constituent power: A de facto constituent power that mobilizes some 
pre-existing, “brute” force (physical or social) to change the way the legal 
system in a given society operates and a de jure constituent power the 
force of which derives from the moral correctness (according to some 
normative system) of the changes that it attempts to implement. (The 
terminology seems to me unfortunate insofar as this language typically is 
employed in rather different senses. De jure, in particular, suggests a legal 
quality, something definitionally apart from constituent power.) He also 
distinguishes between either kind of constituent power and the idea of 
“constituent authority” that I have developed in my writing. He correctly 
notes that the presence or absence of constituent authority is not fixed at 
the moment of enactment. The “authority” supporting the identical 
constitutional text may be different at different times, as a society’s 
understanding of the qualities that an appropriate constitution-maker ought 
to possess changes.4 As I have conceived it, moreover, constituent 
authority exists for any successful constitution and it performs an essential 
function even if it is never again perceived in the way it was perceived at 
the time of its creation.  
My ideas about constituent authority do not conceive of it as an 
alternative to constituent power. It goes without saying that every legal 
system is the result of a set of voluntary actions by human beings–although 
not always actions intended to create a constitution. It follows, therefore, 
that every constitution is, by definition a product of some kind of 
constituent power. My work on constituent authority is an examination of a 
particular aspect of the exercise of constituent power. A successful exercise 
of constituent power requires that there be something about the agents of 
change and the manner in which they operated that will strike the 
population of the relevant state as proper ways to make a fundamental law. 
As Barczentewicz notes, there could be an effective exercise of constituent 
power that relies entirely on physical force to establish and maintain a 
given constitution. Such a regime, however, is unlikely to last very long 
and it is even more unlikely to instill the kind of attitudes toward the state 
and the law that make for effective government.  
                                                                                                                     
3 EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, WHAT IS THE THIRD ESTATE? 128, 131 (M. Blondel trans., S.E. 
Finer ed., 1964) (1789). 
4 The historical facts of enactment, however, may limit the capacity plausibly to formulate a new 
constituent authority that can be associated with the governing constitution. I discuss this in my 
response to Zoran Oklopcic. 
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The need for ultimate popular acquiescence in the source of 
constitutional rules has led many observers to conclude that only a 
democratic process can generate what I have called constituent authority. 
Barczentewicz cites H. L. A. Hart and Andrew Arato for the conclusion 
that constituent power can “be possessed only by ‘the people.’” Just how 
“the people” can express itself has always been a vexing problem and we 
live in a time when “populism” has taken on new and not always 
reassuring forms. Beyond that, however, there is nothing in the idea of 
constituent authority that requires that it be traceable to the preferences of 
the population. Such a requirement conforms to most modern ideas of 
legitimate power but we can easily imagine or recall societies the values of 
which lodged that authority in other entities As I note in my response to 
Yaniv Roznai below, constituent authority may be in a monarch, in the 
clergy, or in any other entity that commands the confidence of society as a 
whole. Insofar as it reflects widely held values, moreover, it begins to 
resemble what Barczentewicz calls de jure constituent power. 
Barczentewicz also makes some interesting and important observations 
on the relationship between constituent power and Hart’s “rule of 
recognition.” As a “social rule,” the latter reflects social practice—
something that cannot respond perfectly to the exercise of a power to 
change the law. But it is also true, as Barczentewicz notes, that the exercise 
of a legal power that results in changes in behavior may itself be one of the 
ingredients influencing the attitudes that are at the core of the rule of 
recognition.5 We can examine this phenomenon in Barczentewicz’s 
discussion of attempts to define the creation or substitution of a new 
constitutional text by promulgation of a rule of positive law. He mentions 
the specification in Article V of the United States Constitution of the 
option of calling national and state constitutional conventions, something 
peculiarly appropriate for wholesale constitutional change. He also cites 
Article 146 of the German Basic Law providing that the Basic Law may be 
replaced by a constitution chosen by a “free decision” of the German 
people. These and other instances can be seen as disproving the claim that 
constituent power is something altogether apart from the exercise of legally 
created power. There are, in fact, judicial decisions—carefully analyzed by 
Yaniv Roznai in his Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The 
Limits of Amendment Powers—that hold that there are some changes that 
are so thorough that they cannot be effected by a power created by the very 
instrument that they aim to abandon. But even when such provisions are 
invoked and appear to be successful, it is unclear if the best way to 
describe such actions is as the result of a legally authorized process. Even 
                                                                                                                     
5 I discuss Hart’s understanding that it is only the viewpoint of officials of the legal system that is 
essential in inferring a rule of recognition in my response to Larry Alexander’s contribution. 
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though it is formally traceable to acts of the United Kingdom Parliament 
that might in theory be repealed, we understand that the current force of the 
Canadian legal system owes nothing to the rule of recognition that 
underlies the legislative power of the Westminster Parliament. The formal 
link only demonstrates what Hart called a “relationship of validating 
purport.”6   
Yaniv Roznai also sees the constituent power as more orderly and 
restrained than the “wild west” described by some commentators. He is 
concerned that even when the sovereign “people” are able to express 
themselves clearly and fairly, they may end up producing a system that 
stifles democracy. This danger is by no means hypothetical, as is clear to 
anyone observing the development of populist political movements in the 
twenty-first century. Even when manifested in an authentically democratic 
constitution-making action, the result may still be a case of “one person, 
one vote, one time.”7 
Roznai first describes some limitations of the constituent power that 
have been suggested in the academic literature, but he dismisses each of 
them as ineffective or insufficient. Historically, all positive law-making 
power has been understood as subject to natural law, rules of conduct that 
stem directly or indirectly from divine law. (I do not, by the way, 
understand Sieyès’s reference to natural law in What is the Third Estate to 
be anything more than an expression of the nation’s immunity to limitation 
by positive law.) In any event, as Roznai concludes, the relative 
formlessness of natural law, in its ancient or its modern versions, deprives 
it of any practical ability to affect the action of the constituent power. 
Natural law, as Justice Iredell, himself a constitution-maker, said, is 
“regulated by no fixed standard” as shown by the fact that “the ablest and 
the purest men have differed upon the subject.”8 
Nor does Roznai find “eternity clauses” in written constitutions, 
prohibiting the use of the amendment power for certain purposes, capable 
of limiting constituent power. Constituent power, by definition, creates a 
new constitution and decommissions the old one. Whatever force the old 
constitution has, including its restrictions on that constitution’s capacity for 
reform, is exhausted once the constituent power is brought to bear on it.  
Finally, Roznai notes the idea that, in certain cases, 
constitution-makers can restrict themselves to creating texts that conform 
to “pre-agreed upon [constitutional] principles.” The best-known example 
                                                                                                                     
6 H. L. A. HART, Kelsen’s Doctrine of the Unity of Law, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY 309, 319–20 (1983). 
7 The phrase was originally used in connection with the election of Islamist governments in the 
Middle East. EDWARD P. DJEREJIAN, DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY: AN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR’S 
JOURNEY THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST 22 (2008). 
8 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798). 
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is the formation of the 1997 South Africa Constitution. He regards the 
observance of those principles, however, as evidencing only voluntary 
behavior, not a real restraint on the enactors’ behavior. Indeed, it may 
make more sense in such cases to understand the exercise of constituent 
power as including the entire process leading to the promulgation of the 
new instrument. It would, that is, take into account the participation of the 
various interest groups typically involved in the formulation of the prior 
principles, as well as the judgment of the court charged with certifying the 
draft constitution’s compliance with those principles. Looked at this way, 
the constituent power, now wielded by a complex set of institutions, would 
still be unrestricted in creating its preferred constitution. 
Roznai goes on, however, to take note of three other kinds of norms 
that he finds may be more effective limits on constitutional creation. He 
mentions first the international obligations of the states engaged in 
constitutional re-writing. It is true that, as matter of international law, 
applicable treaty commitments are understood to bind a state in all of its 
manifestations—when legislating, enforcing law, or constitution-making. 
Certain international norms, moreover, such as those associated with 
modern human rights treaties, will be relevant to the choices of a state in 
enacting a new constitution. Such an obligation, however, arises only 
within the system of international law. The obligation of states to conform 
to international law is itself only a rule of international law. That is all that 
can be shown by the utterances of international tribunals. The force of that 
international law in the legal system of a given state, however, is a matter 
of municipal law—whether it embraces a monist or dualist theory of 
international and domestic law—and that, by definition, is subject to the 
exercise of constituent power. 
Roznai also observes that the near universal adoption of constitutions 
has revealed certain core elements essential to the existence of a 
constitutional state. These include the sovereignty of “the people,” the rule 
of law and the inviolability of certain individual rights. It follows, Roznai 
contends, that when a constituent power establishes a legal system that 
fails to respect these principles, the product will be illegitimate. These 
principles, however, are so general that their application in any given case 
will always generate plausible and honest differences as to whether or not 
they have been observed. In that respect, this limitation presents roughly 
the same problems as those we identified with respect to the discipline (or 
lack thereof) imposed by the norms of natural law.  
Finally, Roznai believes that the very idea of constituent power has 
some limits built into it. Since constituent power is “the power of the 
people” to create a constitutional regime, its exercise must be “inclusive, 
participatory and deliberative.” This recognition necessarily also entails 
respect for certain rights—of expression, assembly, and participation, for 
example—that are presupposed in any democratic process. Although 
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constitution-making is almost always associated with popular choice these 
days, I am not sure that the very idea of constituent power needs to be 
understood this way. The agency that creates a constitution must be 
perceived as possessing the qualities that entitle it to legislate fundamental 
law, but those qualities will be different in different times and places. 
Thus, in some situations, the only credible source may be a grant of the 
monarch (an “octroi constitution”), a certain family or certain religious 
authorities. It is true that currently a constitution-making event will almost 
always have elements that its defenders point to as evincing the approval of 
the population. Nevertheless, we know that there are successful 
constitutions that have resulted from foreign or international pressure or 
from elite negotiation between various interests in society. 
Like Roznai, Joel Colon-Rios explores the possibility that constitution-
making has certain inherent limitations. The process of creating a 
constitution never arises out of a void. Before a new constitution-maker 
begins its work, someone must have been decided that the existing 
constitutional arrangements were no longer acceptable. That decision, most 
probably, was expressed in such form as to convince the political society to 
start up a constituent process. This will almost always result in the 
convocation of some kind of constituent body. (The legislature of an 
existing regime may take this function upon itself, but when it does, it has 
adopted a qualitatively different character.) One need not believe this 
sequence is defined by any positive law to recognize in it a kind of 
principal-agent relationship. 
Based on this reasoning, Colon-Rios argues that even a constituent 
authority must respect implicit limits. Constituent authority, that is, is a 
created power and one must look to the creator and the act of creation to 
discover the tasks that were assigned to it, as well as those that were 
withheld from it. In this picture, only the creator—usually some entity or 
procedure that is taken to represent “the people”—is to be treated as 
genuinely sovereign. Thus, Colon-Rios takes issue with Carl Schmitt’s 
distinction between commissarial and sovereign dictators. For Schmitt, the 
commissarial dictator had defined powers to deal with a pressing 
emergency and was obliged to restore the normal constitutional order as 
soon as possible. In contrast, the sovereign dictator, as the name implies, 
recognized no restriction on either the matters with which it would deal nor 
the means it could employ. Indeed, the “sovereign dictator”—who could be 
an assembly as well as an individual—could be expected to create an 
entirely new constitution. The commissarial dictator is appointed and is a 
functionary under an existing constitution, whereas for Schmitt, the 
sovereign dictator “springs out of a normative nothingness and from a 
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concrete disorder.”9 Colon-Rios reasonably notes that this description fails 
to describe accurately what happens in real constitutional transformations 
and that Schmitt was willing to concede that even the sovereign dictator 
acts on a commission “from the people.” 
Some examples illustrate the point. A common pattern of 
constitution-making is a sequence in which existing state agencies decide 
for one reason or another that an entirely new constitution is necessary. 
Then, with or without legal sanction, a referendum is called on the question 
of whether or not a constituent assembly should be convened. This 
assembly drafts a new document, and that constitution is promulgated, 
usually after a second ratifying referendum. The initial referendum may be 
interpreted to make the consequent assembly a single-purpose institution or 
the question that the referendum approved might have specified that any 
resulting constitution must have or not have certain features. If the 
constituent assembly should then proceed in ways that violate these 
limitations, some people will believe it has acted wrongly, even though the 
whole process, from start to finish, is conceded to be thoroughly illegal 
under the law of the previous regime. 
In such cases, we can say that the constituent body acted “ultra vires.” 
But what exactly are the “vires” which the assembly has exceeded? They 
are certainly not the kinds of legal empowerments with which that 
expression is usually associated. We might expect the members of a 
constitution-drafting body to feel some kind of obligation to the voters who 
participated in the referendum that called that body into being. But, by 
hypothesis, that cannot be a legal obligation. And, as Colon-Rios 
acknowledges, it is far from clear that the voters in a plebiscite will have 
either the intellectual or the moral qualities that would justify their 
authority to impose conditions on the constituent process. As he also notes, 
there are many examples of “runaway” constitution-makers who have cast 
off whatever restrictions were imposed when they were given their 
mandate. Probably the most famous instance is the Philadelphia 
Convention of 1787 that drafted the United States Constitution. The 
mandate of the Continental Congress that called the convention restricted it 
to proposing amendments to the Articles of Confederation, a limitation 
repeated in the commissions of some state delegations. Colon-Rios begins 
his essay by describing the acts of the French National Convention taking 
on the ordinary governance of the state after it finished the drafting work 
for which it had been created. The Convention’s rule was short-lived, but 
its demise was prompted by crimes that were far more serious than its 
violation of the “vires” assigned to it by the Legislative Assembly in 1792. 
                                                                                                                     
9 Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 720 (2011) (quoting Andreas 
Kalyvas, Popular Sovereignty, Democracy and the Constituent Power, 12 CONSTELLATIONS 223, 227 
(2005) (citation omitted)). 
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Colon-Rios’s suggestion that the limits of a constituent assembly’s 
mandate ought to be enforceable in courts raises particularly interesting 
questions. In all these cases, the courts he mentions were created by the 
legal system that was about to be displaced. When the constituent process 
is unauthorized by that prior system it is unclear just what law a court 
could apply in deciding whether the unlawful assembly was obliged to 
follow the instructions arising from the unlawful referendum. Nevertheless, 
as Colon-Rios shows, the unavailability of controlling law has not 
prevented some courts—including American state courts—from hearing 
and deciding such cases. And these judgments can make a difference, as 
was the case when the Supreme Court of Canada issued its critical decision 
during the “patriation” controversy in 1982.10 In these situations, however, 
it is impossible to see the judges as anything but political actors in the legal 
process of making a new constitution.  
The existence of a legal competence for constitution-making is also 
foremost in Warren Newman’s essay. Newman makes the case by 
examining the history of the Canadian legal system. The Canadian 
constitution has gone through various basic changes, every one of which 
appears to have been accomplished with perfect legality. “Canadian 
constitutionalism . . . abhors revolution.” It is true that the various 
Canadian polities have come into being in connection with the invocation 
of some existing legal authority. I have had several occasions to quote a 
1981 statement by the Canadian Ministry of Justice during the great 
patriation debate that Newman discusses: “Canadians take pride in the fact 
that our Constitution unlike those of many nations, is entirely lawful both 
in its origins and its subsequent development.”11As Newman shows, this 
attitude has, with very few exceptions, been evident in official 
pronouncements going back to and before Confederation in 1867 and it has 
been prominent in decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. 
“Legal” constitutional transition has an undeniable appeal, but it may 
be going too far to say that changing the constitution of a regime in a way 
not provided for in the state’s existing law demonstrates that the 
“commitment to constitutionalism itself has been abandoned.” It is enough 
in this regard to refer to occasions when an authoritarian government is 
overthrown and replaced with a liberal government acting under the 
auspices of a new constitution, one that provides for elected officials, 
individual rights, and an independent judiciary. This was the course, for 
example, followed by the government created in the wake of the 1986 
“people power” revolution in the Philippines, an action plainly in conflict 
                                                                                                                     
10 Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (Can. Man.). 
11 Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada and the United States, 7 CAN.-U.S. 
L.J. 111, 138 n.134 (1984) (quoting JEAN CHRÉTIEN, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN THE 
AMENDMENT OF THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION 5 (1981)). 
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with governing law, that ended the Marcos despotism. As we have just 
seen, the existing Constitution of the United States was, as Newman notes, 
established in the teeth of existing law. Both of these examples are 
probably better described as the implementation than the abandonment, of 
constitutionalism.  
There is a sense, moreover, in which the utilization of pre-existing law 
to effect a fundamental change does not really avoid legal discontinuity so 
much as disguise it. The experience of Canada makes that clear. The 
Canadian legal system that came into being in 1867 was the result of 
legislation enacted in the United Kingdom and every subsequent change 
can therefore be traced back to that initial act. But if Canadians were asked 
today why acts of the Canadian parliament ought to bind, very few would 
cite any allegiance owed to the Parliament at Westminster. Sometime 
between 1867 and 2020 the political bottom on which the Canadian legal 
system rests shifted from Britain to Canada. That shift was a matter of 
politics, not law. While the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and the Canada 
Act, 1982—both statutes of the United Kingdom Parliament—do appear to 
legislate a transfer of state authority to Canadian institutions, this is just 
another example of the “relationship of validating purport:” first the 
change in sovereignty, then the statutory acknowledgement. 
There are both advantages and disadvantages to the employment of 
legal form to accomplish what is, in effect, a peaceful revolution. The 
former involve the reassurance that legality can impart to a transition that 
might otherwise disturb a population worried about the unsettling effect of 
an irregular change of government. It might, as Claude Klein has said, help 
secure “une transition en douceur.”12 This is an especially powerful reason 
for invoking legal form in societies where legality has assumed a central 
place in the array of shared political values. So strong was the penchant for 
legality in seventeenth century England that lawyers were able to posit a 
perfect continuity in its constitutional history, starting with an “original 
contract” entered into at some time beyond memory. They vigorously 
denied, for example, that English legal authority originated in the conquest 
of 1066, something that would, as J.G.A. Pocock put it, have left an 
“indelible stain of sovereignty upon the English constitution.”13  
 The disadvantages of reliance on legal form arise from its obscuring 
the real political forces that caused one regime to be established and 
another one to be rejected. That makes it more difficult for public agencies 
to interpret rules and operate institutions in ways that cohere with the real 
values that undergird the state. For the same reason, it may distort honest 
debate about constitutional change. The prolonged Canadian patriation 
                                                                                                                     
12 CLAUDE KLEIN, THĖORIE ET PRATIQUE DU POUVOIR CONSTITUANT 195–96 (1996). 
13 J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH 
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 53 (1957). 
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crisis is a case in point. The substantive issues in controversy concerned 
the extent and allocation of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments and the propriety of a new charter of rights applicable to both 
levels of government. Those issues were difficult enough, but their 
resolution was hardly facilitated by the necessary recourse to the 
Westminster Parliament. It is true, as Newman points out, that patriation 
was finally “effected legally” but it might have been accomplished with 
less “strain on the constitutional system” if the indisputable sovereignty of 
Canada had been recognized and the decisions made in a thoroughly 
Canadian process.  
There is some reason to think that, on balance, the peculiar 
constitutional and federal history of Canada may have made reposing 
ultimate formal authority in the United Kingdom a useful tool in 
negotiating serious political differences on the nature of the Canadian state. 
But, in other circumstances, a compelling case can be made for an overt 
rejection of the formal source of a system’s law. Several Caribbean states 
explicitly rejected their independence constitutions exactly because it was 
deemed seriously incongruous for an independent state to live under a 
constitution that had been given the force of law by the Parliament of a 
foreign state.    
Peter Oliver has a different take on constitutional change but, like 
Newman, he affirms the possibility that such change may be both 
fundamental and legal. Like some other contributions, his analysis blurs 
the distinction between constituent and constituted power. Oliver expounds 
this view by examining the work of R. T. E. Latham who, in the course of 
his tragically shortened academic career in the 1930s, explored basic 
questions of British and Commonwealth constitutional law with insights 
that, in some ways, anticipated work of Hans Kelsen, H. W. R. Wade, and 
H. L. A. Hart. As we have already seen, there are many examples of cases 
where political actors have made fundamental changes to their 
constitutions in ways that are peaceful, orderly, and refer to an apparent 
pre-existing legal authority. The transformation of British colonies into the 
independent states of the Commonwealth of Nations are clear cases. Oliver 
has fruitfully examined those cases in The Constitution of Independence 
(2005). No one disputes that these nations are now thoroughly independent 
in the sense that the political locus of legitimacy for all effective law has 
shifted from Westminster to the local seat of government. And, as we have 
already seen, these changes were memorialized in legal enactments of the 
United Kingdom Parliament. Any differences we have about those 
developments, therefore, come down to the terminology we use to describe 
them. 
As Oliver notes, one label for such changes, one adopted by H. W. R. 
Wade, was “revolution,” a word that Wade believed best characterized 
changes in authority like those that resulted in the independence of former 
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colonies. He thought it was also an appropriate term to describe the 
pre-Brexit subordination of United Kingdom law to that of the European 
Union. Similarly, H. L. A. Hart contended that at a certain point, some 
changes in a legal system’s foundational rules no longer owe their 
effectiveness to decisions enabled by the “rule of recognition” of the 
former legal system. “This is a factual statement and not the less factual 
because it is one concerning the existence of legal systems.”14 Latham (and 
Oliver) dispute the idea that every change that affects the identity of the 
ultimate legal authority should be characterized as a revolution. The reach 
of the rule of recognition, like any legal rule, is in some measure 
indeterminate. Metropolitan courts and courts of the former colony might 
look at the same data and disagree on the contents of that rule. Institutions 
in these two different legal systems may well desist from explicit 
declarations of their different jurisprudential understandings. The original 
rule of recognition may effectively have been transformed in the newly 
independent state, eliminating any role for the law-making institutions of 
the imperial legal system. But each of the steps leading to this result, may 
have been taken in accordance with the formal constitutional allocation of 
authority in force at the time of enactment. On this basis, Oliver concludes 
that the “ultimate rule of a legal system can change by legal means, and not 
just by the sort of revolution noted by H.W.R. Wade.”  
Whether or not this development has in fact occurred consistent with 
legal continuity depends on what we mean by “the ultimate rule of a legal 
system.” According to Oliver, we may mean one of two things. In the first, 
“logical-legal” sense we work our way back to the starting point in a 
“chain of validity.” In that case, we will end up at the imperial power’s 
“abdication” of authority. For reasons already discussed in connection with 
the contribution of Mikolaj Barczentewicz, this raises questions about the 
“authenticity” of the new state’s independence. The second approach does 
not call for us to look backward in time; we are concerned only with “those 
rules that are active and available . . . at the present moment.” 
Definitionally, the authority of the prior metropolitan power is not part of 
the legal system “in [this] vital second sense.” I find it hard to understand 
just how this way of viewing the emergence of a new legal system avoids 
recognition of the essential revolution that has taken place. The subjects of 
the new regime can think about it in this second sense only if they ignore 
the historical fact that something happened that caused the population, or 
the political part of the population, no longer to regard the prior 
law-making power as a proper agency for creation of binding law. This is 
something that would quickly become apparent should the colonial power 
attempt to re-assert its authority over its former possession. Why is it 
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wrong to call this change in the social understanding of constitutional 
legitimacy a revolution? Wade certainly understood that revolutions can 
come in many forms: “When sovereignty is relinquished in an atmosphere 
of harmony, the naked fact of revolution is not so easy to discern beneath 
its elaborate legal dress. But it must be there just the same . . . .”15 
Mapping the causes and consequences of constitutional change 
presents peculiar challenges in the United Kingdom, given the absence of a 
canonical supreme text or a clear procedure for constitutional amendment. 
The effect of this situation is presented vividly in Alison Young’s close 
examination of the momentous developments of the last several years. Of 
course, as she notes, the relevant ground has been shifting for a 
considerably longer time. There was a standard and fairly simple picture of 
the United Kingdom constitution as late as the 1960s. This was the regime 
of “parliamentary sovereignty,” the classic statement of which is found in 
A.V. Dicey’s Law of the Constitution, published at the turn of the twentieth 
century. Parliament (by which Dicey meant the Houses of Commons and 
Lords and the Monarch “acting together”), had “the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever” and “no person or body . . . [had] a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.”16 There was one 
necessary exception: No Parliament could make a law which would reduce 
the legislative authority of future parliaments.  
Parliamentary supremacy fit well with another feature of British 
governance. Members of Parliament are elected according to a “first past 
the post” procedure. This has usually resulted in a solid majority for one 
party, reducing the risk of the kind of parliamentary stalemate that arises 
more often with proportional representation schemes as shown recently in 
countries like Spain, Italy, Greece, and Israel. A UK tradition of rigorous 
party discipline, moreover, has had the result of concentrating power in the 
government and, more particularly, in the Prime Minister. An election 
victory in the usual circumstances, therefore, entrusted the unlimited 
sovereignty of Parliament to the hands of the winning party. That party 
then had little difficulty enacting its preferred program. This is the situation 
to which Young refers when she explicates a “majoritarian” as opposed to 
a “consensual” form of democracy. 
This state of affairs, however, has been under pressure for several 
decades. Young mentions some of the relevant developments. In recent 
years, it has not been uncommon for parliamentary decisions to be limited 
or even overridden by decisions of courts, both international and domestic. 
And, in the most recent, post-Brexit era, the disintegration of the orthodox 
Diceyan view of the constitution appears to have drastically accelerated. 
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But, as Young shows, it is hard to characterize the new developments as 
moving things in any one clear direction. 
One of the reasons that the most recent changes have been so 
perplexing arises from the fact that an unlikely combination of factors 
produced a perfect constitutional storm. Prime Minister Theresa May 
sought an early election and the opposition Labour Party decided to 
concur, providing the two-thirds vote in the Commons required by the 
Fixed Term Parliament Act, 2011. Against all predictions, the outcome of 
that election in June 2017  deprived the Conservative Party of its majority. 
The resulting minority government, therefore, constituted a rare exception 
to the usual secure, one-party government described above. This was the 
Parliament that had to make the decisions associated with the United 
Kingdom’s departure from European Union (Brexit), decisions that were 
perceived as critically important and therefore were intensely contested. 
The Prime Minister’s own parliamentary caucus was bitterly divided. 
Finally, those Brexit decisions could not be debated strictly on their merits 
since Brexit itself had been endorsed in a national referendum. This forced 
the relevant institutions to negotiate what Young properly identifies as a 
conflict between parliamentary sovereignty and popular sovereignty: There 
was no majority in the House of Commons for carrying through the 
“people’s” decision in the 2016 referendum to leave the European Union. 
Another reason for the increased constitutional confusion was the 
progressively more assertive part played by the judiciary in the formulation 
of public decisions. The original 1973 commitment to recognize the 
supremacy of European law had the practical effect of vesting the courts 
with power to review acts of parliament for consistency with European 
norms, including, as Young notes, the European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms. Acts of Parliament could also be challenged in the 
courts insofar as they were alleged to work a violation of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. In the latter case, these laws could be either 
subjected to a “declaration of incompatibility” or “interpreted” as 
consistent with the Convention even if that interpretation departed from the 
meaning intended by Parliament. A third kind of judicial intervention has 
even more potential to destabilize the regime of parliamentary supremacy. 
For more than 50 years, individuals adversely affected by determinations 
of a public body have had the right to challenge the legality of such actions 
by initiating a proceeding in “judicial review.” In addition to finding that 
the agency in question failed to follow appropriate procedures, courts have 
quashed such actions on broad substantive grounds—such as “irrationality” 
or interference with “legitimate expectations.” At first, these decisions 
were justified as a way of confining the executive to the powers granted to 
it by the authorizing act of Parliament, although it was often hard for an 
objective observer to agree that the reviewing court’s rationale was really 
part of the legislative plan. A growing body of opinion, on the other hand, 
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has argued that judicial review was “based not on the will of Parliament, 
but rather on common law created doctrines and principles.”17 This must 
be a rather different kind of common law, however, than the familiar 
judicial development and adaptation of rules regulating private disputes. 
For one thing, those rules were always understood as intrinsically 
subordinate to—and therefore revisable by—parliamentary correction. But 
to the extent that the substance of an executive action fails one of the tests 
devised under this “common law” power, it will be very difficult for 
Parliament to undo the decision. 
Young’s description of the Supreme Court’s holding in the 
Miller/Cherry case, invalidating the Queen’s prorogation of Parliament, 
illustrates how far the courts have gone in assuming a defining role with 
respect to the constitutional shape of the state. The object of review was 
not a form of subordinate legislation which might—even implausibly—be 
argued to be ultra vires its authorizing source. It is uncontroversial that 
prorogation is a decision falling within the royal prerogative, the set of 
decisions of state that have not been regulated by statute. Prerogative is 
“the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time 
is legally left in the hands of the Crown.”18 There is, by definition, no 
positive law that controls what the monarchy may and may not do when 
acting within the prerogative power. Insofar as the “common law” controls 
that kind of decision, there is no reason why it ought not equally control 
acts of Parliament when the judges find those acts offensive to the 
“fundamental principles” embedded in the United Kingdom legal system. 
The Miller/Cherry case is a good example of the slipperiness of such 
principles. The ones invoked there were “parliamentary sovereignty and 
parliamentary accountability.” It should go without saying that these 
concepts are sufficiently flexible that when they are held to govern, any 
outcome can be supported with explanations that sound reasonable.  
Having said this, it may be important to point out that the unsettled 
situation that seems to be overtaking the United Kingdom would not be 
prevented by the adoption of a written constitution enforceable by 
independent courts. The restraints imposed on the government of the 
United States after 230 years of constitutional rule are just about as hard to 
discover as those that may or may not be emerging in the UK. It is a 
commonplace observation that the United States Supreme Court decisions 
“interpreting” the United States Constitution (something more directly 
considered in connection with the essays on constitutional interpretation 
discussed below) are dictated by the rules in that document only in the 
loosest sense. As a result, it is impossible to know with much assurance 
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how much influence the judges will have on public decisions or what the 
outcome of their interaction with the political departments of the state will 
be. That these two societies, organized with such different constitutional 
structures, may end up in roughly the same place, reminds us that the most 
fitting personal quality for nation-builders is humility. 
The instinct to search for legal explanations for even basic 
constitutional change is not unique to lawyers or legal scholars. As 
Anthony Bradley shows in his characteristically precise and accurate 
review of my book, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law, 
people in general may look for legal justification even when they are 
dealing with an obvious breach of legal standards. In 1688–1689, the 
revolutionaries clearly violated the constitutional rule requiring hereditary 
succession to the English monarchy. In declaring the new King and Queen, 
they passed over James II, his infant son, and (in the case of the Prince of 
Orange’s ascent to the throne) James’s daughter, Princess (later Queen) 
Anne. Though there were historical precedents for such actions, they were 
at that time more than 200 years old. Since the accession of Henry VII in 
1483, every new monarch had been next in the line of succession 
according to the rule of primogeniture. The revolutionaries’ plain deviation 
from the constitution, however, did not stop the supporters of the new 
settlement from casting the succession of William and Mary as lawful. 
Their explanation was not that the new king and queen were the proper 
heirs but that the hereditary line had “run out” and the throne was therefore 
“vacant.”  
That the revolutionaries were willing to embrace this highly 
implausible theory tells us something about the value they put on the 
ability to disguise their unconstitutional action with a façade of legality. It 
was important to them to claim that the English legal system in 1689 was 
the same system that had prevailed in 1688. This is one reason why the 
interregnum of December 11 to February 13 that Bradley discusses created 
such distress for contemporaries. By their own logic, it was necessary that 
the throne be “vacant,” so that they would be in a position to “fill” it with 
William and Mary. But then, as now, all public authority in England was, 
at least in form, a manifestation of the monarch’s authority. So, for 
example, crimes were offenses against the king and, in theory, could not be 
committed if there were no king in being. Retrospective legislation in April 
1689 clumsily provided that crimes in the relevant period could now be 
prosecuted “as if” they had been committed before December 11. This 
situation was without English precedent. The argument Bradley cites, that 
there “must have been an interregnum” in the 1640s and 1650s, fails to 
take into account the fact that, since the question is one of law, it can be 
answered only from within one or another legal system. Once Charles II 
was restored in 1660, the officials of that legal system viewed his reign as 
having begun at the moment of his father’s execution in 1649. From that 
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point of view, there had continuously been a king-in-being, 
notwithstanding the various novel institutions that were in practical charge 
and that had claimed lawful authority during that period. After 1660, the 
acts of those interim governments were treated as without legal effect. 
Some, but not all of them were—they had to be—confirmed by the 
restored king in parliament. That course of action was unavailable in 1689. 
The legal system after the later revolution was the one in which William 
and Mary were lawful sovereigns. The constitutional premises of that 
system left no choice but to recognize their accession as occurring on 
February 13 when the Convention proclaimed their accession to fill the 
“vacancy” of the throne. That essential “vacancy” required recognition of 
James’s “abdication on December 11. If the pretense of a legal succession 
were to be maintained, there had to be this period without a monarch. Of 
course, had there been no restoration in 1660, whatever government 
replaced the Stuarts might also have looked upon 1649-1660 as a time 
without a state, but the very constitutional centrality of the hereditary 
crown relieved the 1660 statesmen of that necessity, just as it encouraged 
the 1689 regime to elide it. 
Bradley, like Alison Young, is right to suggest that the unique 
unwritten nature of the British constitution continues to influence how 
answers to fundamental questions about legal authority evolve in the 
United Kingdom. And, like her, he is right to present the Miller/Cherry 
case of 2019 as his primary exhibit. The assertion of “common law” norms 
to control the exercise of the prerogative is a cardinal example of the kind 
of opposition between specific legal doctrine and broad constitutional 
principles that characterized the legal debates involved in making the 
Glorious Revolution. In both cases, reliance on specific positive law 
necessarily restricts the scope of potential constitutional change, while 
citation only of the large values underlying the legal system opens many 
more possibilities. It is notable that in the recent case, the wider sources of 
law on which the Supreme Court relied were labeled doctrines of the 
common law. Insofar as the rules emerging from such doctrines control the 
decisions of Parliament and the Crown, it will follow that future 
constitutional evolution will be crucially directed by the judiciary. 
Constitutional change is also at the center of Mark Janis’s examination 
of the disestablishment of the Congregational church in Connecticut by the 
adoption of the state constitution of 1818. The prior constitution dated 
from 1662 and was in the form of a charter issued by King Charles II at the 
request of Connecticut’s colonists. While it did not, in express terms, 
create the church or provide for its support, it posed no obstacle to such an 
establishment. When, or shortly after, the thirteen American colonies 
declared independence in 1776, eleven of them adopted new constitutions. 
Connecticut, however, was content with its Charter which had ensured 
significant self-government. Instead of a new constitution, at independence 
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the legislature enacted a statute confirming that the Charter “would remain 
the civil constitution of the state,” though now “under the sole authority of 
the people, independent of any king or prince.”19 It is notable that this 
decision, unlike that of several other states, was made by the colonial 
legislature and not by any special, ad hoc convention. 
The Charter of 1662 allowed a “theocratic” government, one that 
roughly suited the political and religious preferences of Connecticut’s 
population. As Janis notes, the colony was overwhelmingly 
Congregationalist at that time. But 150 years is a long time. Among the 
changes occurring over that period was increasing religious diversity. 
Many residents found themselves paying for the maintenance of the 
Congregationalist church even though they disagreed with its tenets. At the 
same time, unfair suffrage rules advantaging the dominant Federalist Party 
became more noticeable. Under the Charter, moreover, the General Court 
served as “the political legislature, executive, and judiciary . . . and as the 
presiding religious ecclesiastical body . . . .” This concentration of power 
contravened both the separation of powers and the separation of church 
and state, concepts which were already foundational in most other 
American jurisdictions. There was, therefore, an increasing if indistinct 
misalignment between the formal rules of the Charter-Constitution and the 
political values of the population governed by it. It is not unusual, 
however, for societies to live satisfactorily with sub-optimal constitutional 
rules. That seemed to be the case in Connecticut in the period after 
independence. Constitutional reform was slow in coming.  
When, however, in response to the failure of the Hartford Convention 
in 1815, the Federalist powers-that-were looked politically vulnerable, the 
universe of constitutional possibilities expanded, and reformers captured a 
majority of the legislature even under the old rules. Their election platform 
included a pledge to institute a new constitution. But now they confronted 
another problem. The Charter of 1662 contained no provision for 
amendment, to say nothing of replacement. When that instrument had been 
authoritative only because it reflected the will of the monarch, such a 
device would have been superfluous. As noted, the alteration of 1776 
changing only the Charter’s political status, had been embodied in an 
ordinary act of the colonial legislature. No one, at that time, seemed 
particularly worried that such a procedure might be insufficient for the 
purpose. The reformist majority of 1818, however, apparently did not 
consider following the 1776 precedent.  American constitution-making had 
come a long way since 1776. The earliest state constitutions were drafted 
quickly and, in most cases, adopted by the state legislatures. The fairly 
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frequent experiments in new constitutions that were made in the following 
decades converged on certain principles. Most importantly, it became 
universally accepted that constitutional texts were the highest form of 
positive law as a result of their promulgation by the fundamental 
constituent power. In turn-of-the-19th century America, that power was the 
“will of the people.” The lawmakers of 1818, therefore, had to find a 
practical way to identify “the people’s” desires and “the people’s” 
approval. The broader American experience also suggested that the proper 
mode of securing that authorization was the election of a special 
convention to draft a new constitution. And once such a draft was 
produced, it would be submitted to the voters. Nothing about this sequence 
was found in any positive law, neither in the Charter nor anywhere else. 
The election and meeting of that convention were set in motion only by a 
law that the General Court made for this occasion. But, in this context, 
alegality was actually an advantage. “The people,” it is true, were also 
represented in the ordinary legislative process and, indeed, the convention 
contained many of the same men. But, when they were assembled as the 
“constituted” General Court, they were definitionally incompetent to enact 
a new constitution. In this case, the whole process including the convention 
and subsequent referendum was completed in about five months. Though 
frequently amended, the resulting text served the state for about another 
150 years until another convention and another referendum—still not 
provided for by law—produced the current document in 1965. 
Like several of the contributors already discussed, the essays of Peter 
Lindseth and Zoran Oklopcic cast doubt on the distinction between legal 
constituted power and pre-legal or alegal constituent power. Lindseth’s 
description of my scholarship is both accurate and illuminating, as is his 
recognition that I am keenly interested in the necessary interface between 
law and not-law. He explores this question with the help of ideas 
propounded by Maurice Hauriou, an important French “institutionalist” 
legal scholar working at the turn of the twentieth century. Hauriou was 
interested in the ways in which law responds to important changes in the 
society in which it operates. He situated legal change in the flux of “social 
facts—economic, political, cultural, historical, ideological . . . .” As 
Lindseth observes, this examination shows an affinity to H. L. A. Hart’s 
understanding of the things that may figure in changes in the “rule of 
recognition.” Hart made only the most cursory references to the “different 
disturbing factors” that might cause “a breakdown in the complex 
congruent practice which is referred to when we make the external 
statement of fact that a legal system exists.”20 Hart’s examples—
revolution, enemy occupation, anarchy, banditry—seem to neglect the 
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more likely situation in which gradual changes in social norms and shared 
political principles eventually make a particular system of law generation 
and application unsuitable for the society in which it operates. Hart’s 
description of the emergence of independent legal systems from the 
colonial legal system of the British empire, on the other hand, illustrates 
exactly the kind of complex social development that can eventually result 
in fundamental constitutional change—the same type of thing that features 
prominently in Hauriou’s depiction of legal evolution. 
Lindseth notes correctly that in both my Constituent Authority and The 
Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law, I assume that when one 
legal system is abandoned and a new one has been embraced, we will, by 
definition, observe a departure from the law of the prior regime. In fact, the 
best way to know if the acceptable devices for law generation and 
application have altered is the emergence of a pattern of noncompliance 
with the primary rules properly created under the previous setup.21 
Revolutions, as Hart said, “will always involve the breach of some of the 
laws of the existing system.”22 That seemed to me to be clearly the case in 
the Glorious Revolution, especially in connection with the critical rule 
about hereditary succession to the crown. Lindseth is right that the volume 
could just as aptly have been titled The Glorious Revolution and the 
Discontinuity of Law. 
This distinction between legally authorized change and alegal change 
goes to the heart of the works that Lindseth reviews. He contrasts this 
distinction with Hauriou’s vision of the development of a legal system. As 
noted, Hauriou emphasized the plurality of non-legal factors that could 
affect the evolution of legal rules. “The line of causation will always be 
multidimensional” and there will usually be a bias “in favor of gradual 
change . . . within the confines of a more enduring institutional ‘settlement’ 
. . . .” What we have, then, is a complicated sociological phenomenon 
which, most of the time, involves not the clean substitution of one set of 
principles for another, but a dynamic, inexact, and unpredictable process. 
The results depend on the particular set of forces in play in society at 
various times. And, as Lindseth makes clear, these forces may include 
pre-existing legal values. “We cannot escape,” he says, “the inherited 
institutional and legal constructions of that terrain, including in our 
analysis of politics and society.” Looking at this extended and recursive 
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legal justifications, they were “fak[ing] it.” RICHARD S KAY, THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION AND THE 
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process, it is impossible and would be misleading to isolate and measure 
individual influences on social development. 
I find nothing to disagree with in this description of the way law, 
politics, economics, and many other aspects of society interact. A principal 
purpose of my work on the seventeenth century English constitutional 
settlement was to emphasize the importance that popular regard for legality 
had in that process. 
Lindseth may think that my description too easily labels things as law 
or not-law. Hauriou’s picture of the evolution of legal systems suggests 
that, given the unavoidably complicated set of mutual influences on legal 
change, such a classification can distort the real historical situation. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned in my comments about the contribution of 
Anthony Bradley, it seems clear that the participants in the revolutionary 
events in 1688 and 1689 were usually less concerned about legal “values” 
than they were about rules of “hard law.” When the House of Lords asked 
their legal experts about the “original contract,” they received mostly 
abstract and obscure speculations. Based on the Lords’ subsequent debate, 
however, they seem to have been most influenced by the quite different 
kind of answer offered by William Petyt, an aggressive advocate of 
parliamentary power. His account of the controlling law was concrete and 
specific. “The original of government,” he announced, “came from 
Germany.”23 He then detailed a list of examples that he believed 
demonstrated Parliament’s legal power to choose a monarch. This looked 
like real law and the members of the Convention must have felt they 
needed the support of such law to fill the “vacancy in the throne.” When 
they debated the rules of succession to the throne, they relied not on the 
“spirit” of the law but on what they took to be specific binding legal rules. 
Such law could be supported or doubted, demonstrated or refuted by actual 
historical evidence. There were and are, of course, close cases but there 
also were and are many things that are clearly legal or illegal. 
The same can be said of Lindseth’s statement that it is unhelpful to try 
and understand any legal system as developing from a well-defined 
beginning. Lindseth is right insofar as we are seeking some historical 
moment when law was introduced into a society which had moral, 
political, and social mores, but no law: States of nature are only found in 
treatises. But I do not believe this means that an examination of the 
historical roots of a given system cannot tell us something useful about the 
things that account for the obligatory force of law. The subjects of a legal 
system may and usually do understand and respect the existing law 
because of their perception of the events that created it. Americans’ 
reverential attitude towards the constitutional founders is well known. The 
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Revolution of 1688-1689 played a central role in the development of 
British parliamentary democracy. In both cases, it is beyond question that 
the pre-existing legal framework was a critical ingredient in fashioning the 
new regime. But in both cases, it is equally clear that the transition 
involved a breach of that prior law and that the fact of that breach 
influenced subsequent development. If we are interested in the most 
thorough description of the development of law over time, we will do very 
well to pay attention to Hauriou—and Lindseth. But for purposes of 
analysis, it is sometimes essential to abstract certain features from the 
historical record. This is, after all, what Hauriou did in artificially 
separating the functional, political, and cultural dimensions of 
institutionalization. Likewise, we will sometimes better understand a 
historical situation by distinguishing the legal from the non-legal, and 
origins from consequences. 
Like Lindseth, Zoran Oklopcic doubts the possibility of clearly 
distinguishing constituted from constituent authority. He propounds, in 
fact, a sweeping challenge to the methods and vocabulary of theoretical 
speculation on constitutional change. I—and most of the contributors to 
this symposium who deal with the subject—have approached the 
phenomenon of change as involving an essentially temporal sequence. We 
posit a society with a constitution that strikes a significant part of the 
governed population as unsatisfactory. From this situation follows some 
kind of political process exhibiting characteristics that enable it to create 
and enact a substitute constitution that is then in force for some extended 
period of time. In my writing, moreover, I have emphasized what I believe 
to be a necessary connection between the nature of the constitution-making 
process and the extent to which the arrangements it puts into operation are 
able to command the sustained allegiance of the society. This is the 
relationship between, as Oklopcic puts it “the process and the product, 
‘between the way one gets there and the result.’” 
Oklopcic raises doubts about the accuracy of this account of 
constitution-making and constitutional authority. Thus, he supposes that 
popular attachment to a constitution should have less to do with regard for 
the procedures that brought it into being than with “the actual success 
which that government has had in making a material difference in the lives 
of the citizens.” It is certainly true that the material accomplishment of a 
regime is an essential part of what we mean when we speak of a 
constitution’s “success.”24 But that capacity is not the only factor necessary 
to secure acceptance. It does not, that is, exclude as irrelevant the forms 
and procedures employed in the constitution’s adoption. To speak more 
                                                                                                                     
24 I have said that to be effective “some minimum part of the relevant population must find the 
constitution’s substantive rules satisfactory, or at least tolerable.” Kay, Constituent Authority, supra 
note 9, at 756. 
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precisely, the perception of the genesis of the constitution must be 
consistent with widely held ideas about political legitimacy. Thus, 
Oklopcic is certainly right when he notes that it is highly unlikely that a 
cold-eyed evaluation of the adoption of the United States Constitution 
would conclude that it genuinely expressed the will of the American 
population of 1787-1789. Nevertheless the (largely unexamined) 
assumption that the Constitution is the authentic act of “we the people” is 
ubiquitous in American political discourse. Oklopcic asserts that neither 
the Constitution nor the centrality of popular sovereignty has featured 
prominently in American public culture. My own impression is the 
opposite. The phenomenon of “constitution-worship” is widely 
acknowledged. In fact, one of the works that Oklopcic cites in that 
connection opens with a description of the of the paradoxical situation in 
the United States whereby “[f]or almost two centuries [the Constitution] 
has been swathed in pride yet obscured by indifference: a fulsome rhetoric 
of reverence more than offset by the reality of ignorance.”25 A brief trip to 
the hagiographic National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, visited by 
almost 260,000 people in 2018, should erase most doubts on the subject. 
Oklopcic’s concerns about too straightforward an analysis of the 
course of constitutional change is one aspect of a more basic criticism of 
attempts to nail down descriptions of legal developments. Explanations of 
legal decision making are inescapably contingent. So, with respect to my 
invitation to think about law as a set of rules regulating the activity of a 
certain group of human beings occupying a defined territory, Oklopcic 
insists that if we think this assumption “is reasonable, it [must be] in light 
of some ‘other possibilities’ that we must have already considered—which 
is to say imagined.” “[T]hat conclusion,” he goes on “may not be so 
reasonable if we assumed that a number of these communities belong to a 
federal state whose integrity they contest, or within a supranational 
organization, as the peoples of its member-states.” It is unclear to me how 
we could critically think about either of these arrangements without 
incorporating the geographically defined associations of individuals. But 
on the larger point, I am in complete agreement. Legal systems might 
easily be conceived on a non-territorial basis and, in fact, many such 
systems exist. Furthermore, the impact of any law may be dependent not 
only on the historical decisions involved in its enactment but also on the 
reception of that law over time. Rules, at least as lawyers use the term, 
always operate through the medium of human perception and response. 
It is one thing, however, to understand that the state of the law at any 
instant is a product of choices that might have been made otherwise. It is 
                                                                                                                     
25 MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (Routledge 2017) (1986). 
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quite another to infer from that recognition that it is impossible to draw 
useful conclusions about the factors that have brought one or more legal 
systems into being and the kinds of events that may or may not plausibly 
be expected to cause a given system to survive or perish. That is because 
the choices that people make, even the choices they make about how to 
characterize past events, must deal with some things that are not 
themselves contingent on human decisions. People who occupy certain 
territory do speak certain languages. Certain people do command the 
armed forces. Louis XVI was guillotined in 1793. That is why I made the 
remark that Oklopcic quotes about the human ability to reconceive the 
historical events that are believed to have invested the constitution-makers 
with constituent authority: “The materials available to construct that 
narrative are malleable but they are not infinitely malleable. The 
constituent authority may be many things, but it is not anything we want it 
to be.”26 
It is impossible to argue with Oklopcic’s observation that infinite 
contingencies have been built into our theories about the normative force 
of law. But, as he also notes, we can say nothing valuable about 
phenomena such as constitutionalism unless we “cut out,” put to the side, 
some, indeed most, of the possibilities. The ability to choose invests us 
with power to frame our views of the world. To take into account, on the 
other hand, all the innumerable ways in which the law might have 
developed can lead only to paralysis. This is one of the reasons why, 
despite the many valid insights they produced, theories like American legal 
realism and critical legal studies have tended to sputter out. Speaking of 
Karl Llewelyn and the realists, Grant Gilmore summed up the problem: 
Llewellyn and his co-conspirators were right in everything 
they said about the law. They skillfully led us into the 
swamp. Their mistake was in being sure that they knew the 
way out of the swamp: they did not, at least we are still 
there.27 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Theories of constitutional interpretation all suppose that the rules at the 
apex of a legal system, embedded in a fixed text are capable of being 
understood and applied to the decisions of government. The essay of 
Aviam Soifer raises doubts about this basic premise of constitutionalism. 
Soifer’s analysis suggests that the text of the United States 
Constitution may not provide the resources necessary to support 
                                                                                                                     
26 Kay, Constituent Authority, supra note 9, at 761 (citation omitted). 
27 Grant Gilmore, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 1251, 1252 (1951) (reviewing KARL LLEWELLYN, 
THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951)). 
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determinate resolutions of disputes about the meaning of its rules. He 
emphasizes the “malleability of constitutional text.” It is true that there are 
many terms in the United States Constitution—and in truth, in pretty much 
all constitutions—the language of which might yield multiple and 
conflicting results in particular controversies. The Fourth Amendment that 
prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures” is a perfect example. But, 
of course, not all of the Constitution is like this. There are some very 
specific rules such as the number of Senators to which a state is entitled. 
And there are some in-between rules such as the bar on a state entering into 
a “treaty, alliance or confederation.” If we think that a constitutional 
interpreter should respond differently depending on the kind of text in 
issue, he or she will need to decide which rules fall into which category. 
My own view, based on what I understand be the logic of 
constitutionalism, has been that the applicable content of any constitutional 
rule is a function of the intentions that the constitutional lawmakers had in 
creating the rule. When we focus on those intentions even the most obscure 
constitutional language can be made to yield a usable meaning, at least in 
the context of a particular controversy. 
 The same emphasis illuminates the problems Soifer identifies in some 
of the late Justice Scalia’s readings of the Constitution. Scalia, of course, 
was a well-known, perhaps the best-known, exponent of the form of 
interpretation known as originalism which requires interpreters, and 
especially judges, to apply only the original meaning of the language of the 
text. There are, however, at least two ways of understanding what we mean 
by “original meaning.” One version adopted the approach just discussed by 
looking for the meaning intended by the people whose assent made the 
constitution law. But a later and now prevalent kind of originalism insisted 
on examining only the objective meaning of the text in question, that is the 
meaning this language had for competent speakers of the language of the 
text at the time of its adoption. It is this latter kind of interpretation that 
Justice Scalia preached. He formulated the distinction this way: “What I 
look for in the Constitution is precisely what I look for in a statute: the 
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”28 
The refusal to think about the intended meaning of constitutional rules 
is at least partly responsible for some of Scalia’s perplexing positions. 
Soifer points to the language of the Ninth Amendment declaring that the 
enumeration of specific rights in the Constitution “shall not be construed to 
                                                                                                                     
28 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). Scalia’s references to the “draftsmen” or, in 
other cases, to the “framers,” misstates the intentions that are relevant for “intentionalists” like me. I am 
interested in the intentions of the actual constitution-makers. In the case of the original United States 
Constitution, these are the original ratifiers. 
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deny or disparage others retained by the people.”29 Looked at apart from 
the history of its adoption, this language is indeed, “open-ended.” This is 
not the place to set out the evidence, but I and other scholars have 
explained what the congressional and state enactors most likely intended. 
Those intentions were not to invest the judiciary with the power to 
formulate new rights that would be enforceable against the political 
departments. The same kind of inquiry might explain the Supreme Court’s 
1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana. The Court held that, even though, in 
terms, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only an interpretation of the 
Constitution’s grant of judicial power that would allow actions against a 
state “by Citizens of another State . . . or Subjects of any Foreign State,”30 
a state was also immune to actions in federal courts by its own citizens. I 
am not qualified to endorse or dispute the Supreme Court’s history in that 
judgment, but it should be noted that the unanimous holding was not at all 
an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. The Court rather held that 
the original grant of authority to the federal courts in Article III was never 
intended to eliminate the immunity of States to suits by any private 
persons. These examples illustrate what I meant when I said in a recent 
article: “We can derive a picture of actually intended meaning that is 
qualitatively richer than one inferred from an investigation that is restricted 
to standard language use at the time of enactment.”31 
 Soifer is right, however, to point to other cases in which courts, and 
especially the United States Supreme Court, have made decisions that are 
clearly indefensible as application of the constitutional rules, whether 
understood in their original objective or intended sense. Over the long 
course of the Court’s history, the consequences of these judgments have 
probably equally distressed people on both the left and the right ends of the 
political spectrum. This sustained record suggests that, as a matter of 
human psychology, the project of constitutionalism, of submission to fixed 
rules, may be impractical. Nevertheless, for reasons I have set out 
elsewhere, I believe the beneficial effects of the establishment of a 
constitutional state may turn up in places other than in the judgments of the 
highest constitutional court. And, although the role of such a court may be 
problematic as an instrument of classical constitutionalism, it may still 
serve other useful functions. I discuss these briefly in my response to 
James Allan. 
The distinction just mentioned, between the objective public meaning 
of legal texts and the meaning actually intended by a text’s creators, is the 
focus of Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s characteristically rigorous examination of 
                                                                                                                     
29 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
31 Richard S. Kay, Construction, Originalist Interpretation and the Complete Constitution, 19 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 17 (2017). 
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Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner’s 2012 monograph, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts. As noted above, Scalia is probably the most 
prominent advocate of restricting the interpretation of statutes and 
constitutions to their objective public meaning, that is, to the meaning that 
would have been inferred from the text’s language by a competent and 
informed reader at the time of enactment. In constitutional interpretation, 
this is the approach that is currently embraced by most self-identified 
originalists. For Scalia and Garner, the legislative intention that interpreters 
have purported to rely on for centuries is “pure fiction.” The only 
intentions that may be inferred from examination of the process of 
legislation is that “the final language . . . pass[] into law.” In contrast, 
Goldsworthy affirms the proposition that “sensible interpretation of 
enacted laws necessarily presupposes the existence of [lawmakers’] 
intentions, and endeavours to reveal and clarify them.” I find his 
demonstration of that position thoroughly convincing. 
In his review of Reading Law, Goldsworthy shows the implausibility 
of the intentionless meaning promoted by Scalia and Garner. He identifies 
many occasions on which the book either explicitly relies on the intention 
of the legislature or adopts rules of interpretation that necessarily 
incorporate such reliance. They concede that on certain occasions, an 
inspection of the text alone is insufficient to arrive at a proper 
interpretation without consideration of the context in which it was adopted. 
Goldsworthy notes that context contributes to meaning only because it tells 
us something about the reasons those words were chosen by the lawmakers 
confronting a particular situation. This is true in almost all instances of 
verbal communication, but it has particular force in the context of 
lawmaking, where language has legal force only when expressed by certain 
authorized human beings.  
Scalia and Garner acknowledge the same necessary relevance of 
legislative intentions when they grant that there are occasions on which 
interpreters may properly consult data that cannot be inferred from the 
mere words of an enactment. Their willingness to recognize “scriveners’ 
errors,” for example, only makes sense if we presume there was a “correct” 
expression, one not distorted by the transcription mistake. Similarly, the 
“golden rule,” requiring interpreters to reject language leading to an absurd 
result presupposes that legislators never intend to enact an absurdity. So, 
we take it for granted that when the Arkansas legislature enacted a 
provision declaring that “[a]ll laws and parts of laws, and particularly Act 
311 of the Acts of 1941, are hereby repealed,”32 lawmakers did not really 
intend to repeal “all laws.” 
                                                                                                                     
32 Cernauskas v. Fletcher, 201 S.W.2d 999, 1000 (Ark. 1947). 
 
2021] RESPONSE TO THE CONTRIBUTORS 1749 
 
As Goldsworthy shows, recourse to a writer’s intention when dealing 
with a written communication is so natural that we actually lack an 
adequate vocabulary to talk about the meaning and force of a legal text 
without employing words that refer to the mental states of the author. That 
is manifest from an examination of Reading Law in which the authors 
frequently refer to the question of what “is meant” by certain language. 
The use of the passive voice in this phrase evades the specification of who 
or what “means” something. At some level, every use of the verb “means” 
assumes a human subject. (The same is true of Scalia and Garner’s 
frequent statements about a statute’s “purpose.”) Goldsworthy points out 
that “strictly speaking texts do not seek to achieve anything; ‘text’ here 
must be a metonym for the maker of the text.” So, it is entirely unclear 
what Scalia and Garner can mean when they criticize the “slippery 
reference to intent . . . as opposed to ‘meaning.’” 
The simple truth is that every legal text arises from some intentional 
human effort.33 Statutes do not appear in the statute book by themselves. 
The process of conceiving an idea for legislation, studying it, 
compromising its terms and convincing legislators to approve it are all 
essential for creation of an effective law. It is obvious, moreover, that these 
legislators intend more than the legal memorialization of a given set of 
words. Their objectives are practical not literary. They intend, by 
permitting, requiring, or prohibiting certain activities, to affect human 
behavior. The creation of a given text is simply the means by which that 
conduct may be affected. 
Scalia and Garner repeatedly deride the notion of an “intention of the 
legislature” as a fiction. But it is the idea of an intentionless verbal 
communication that is the more fantastic idea. The use of language in 
lawmaking and law itself is part of a purposive human enterprise. “Not: 
‘Without language we could not communicate with one another’—but for 
sure: without language we cannot influence other people in such-and-such 
ways; cannot build roads and machines, etc.”34 To treat legal texts as 
independent of the intentions of the human beings who created them is to 
rip them out of the complex of human social activity, the only place where 
they make sense. 
In his contribution, Mark Graber examines two issues associated with 
originalist constitutional interpretation. The first, which we have just 
                                                                                                                     
33 “Suppose that printing type thrown by the handful from the top of a tower fell to earth to form 
Racine’s Athalie, what would be the conclusion? That some intelligence has governed the fall and the 
arrangement of the type.” JOSEPH DE MAISTRE, THE GENERATIVE PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL 
CONSTITUTIONS: STUDIES ON SOVEREIGNTY, RELIGION, AND ENLIGHTENMENT 152 (Jack Lively ed. & 
trans., 1965). 
34 LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 137e (Gertrude Anscombe trans., 
3d ed., 1958). 
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considered, concerns whether “original meaning” should be determined 
based on the original intentions of the enactors or from the objective 
meaning of the enacted language prevalent at the time of enactment. The 
second issue is whether either form of originalism is sustainable as the time 
following adoption increases and the original text becomes less and less 
suitable for the society in question. 
With respect to the first question, Graber distinguishes the currently 
predominant original public meaning originalism from what he calls 
“original intentions/expectations” originalism. The latter conflates two 
approaches that the academic literature has distinguished. Original 
expectations usually refers to applications of the rule in question that were 
anticipated by the enactors. For example, “The Fifth Amendment will 
prohibit racially segregated schools in the District of Columbia.” Original 
intentions, on the other hand, refers to the criteria that define the category 
of action that the enactors intended the rule to cover. Although I believe 
the best way to think about these issues directs us to original intentions not 
original expectations, I also think that knowing the original expectations is 
helpful in sussing out the character of the original intentions. Therefore, I 
will treat Graber’s analysis as arguing on behalf of original intentions 
originalism and his references to the enactors’ “predictions” as ancillary to 
that enterprise. 
The distinction between original intended meaning and original public 
meaning is unlikely to make a practical difference in the overwhelming 
majority of cases. Enactors will want their rule to be understood by the 
people whose behavior they are targeting and will therefore choose the 
words typically used to effect that result. Only on the rarest occasions will 
legislators enact a rule that fails to communicate their intentions. On those 
unusual occasions, however, I find Graber’s arguments about the 
inevitability of recourse to the original intentions, at least in the period 
immediately after enactment, to be entirely persuasive. As I mentioned in 
connection with Jeffrey Goldsworthy’s essay, rule makers are not 
interested in uttering words with a particular meaning other than as a 
means of affecting the conduct of the rule’s addressees. Original public 
meaning erroneously “replaces politics with etymology.” 
While Graber finds that, initially, original intentions ought to be 
determinative (at “Day 1,”) he believes that that approach to interpretation 
is less cogent as the time between enactment and application increases (at 
“Day 10.”) (Of course, at the real Day 10 all of Graber’s arguments for 
original intentions are fully applicable. One problem with the use of this 
conceit is that it elides the question of how much time will have to go by 
before that abandonment of originalism becomes necessary.) Constitutions 
create certain institutions and set out certain rules in order to prevent some 
undesirable actions and encourage the production of certain social benefits. 
The problem is that as times and circumstances change, the original 
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devices may become less and less effective. At least as significantly, the 
very objects of the original constitutional project—the good to be 
promoted and the evils to be inhibited—will also tend to change. At this 
point, sticking to the intended constitutional rules will no longer enhance 
the welfare of the society in the way that would have been forecast at the 
time of enactment. It may make sense, therefore, for constitutional 
decisionmakers to look elsewhere in resolving the issues brought before 
them. They may decide to deviate from the intended meaning, gradually 
modifying the substance of the controlling rules in common law fashion, 
what Graber calls doctrinalism. Or they may believe that the only way to 
remain true to the larger goals of the founders is by altering the obsolete 
techniques of the original scheme, embracing what Graber calls 
purposivism. 
In response to these suggestions, we might, as noted, ask what 
standards interpreters ought to apply in deciding when the original rules 
and institutions have become so unsuitable as to justify departing from 
them. Also, assuming this condition is met, it will often be the case that 
there will be more than one way to respond to the altered situation that 
requires an extra-constitutional solution. It will be necessary, that is, to 
choose how the new non-textual powers, procedures, and rights should be 
shaped. In short, once originalism is abandoned, there will be a wide 
universe of possibilities and no uniquely appropriate guide for choosing 
among them. This state of affairs raises the kind of risks that worried 
Jefferson when he said “[o]ur peculiar security is in the possession of a 
written constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.”35 
Although Graber refers broadly to “constitutional decision-makers,” at the 
end of the day this will usually mean judges. We can end up, that is, with 
the familiar situation whereby ultimate legal authority in the state will be 
transferred from a fixed and abstract constitution to flexible, palpable 
human beings. 
This kind of arrangement of the powers of government has its 
advantages. As Graber makes graphically clear, a state that is subject to 
rigid limitations is bound to come up against circumstances that the 
constitution-makers never contemplated, and that any reasonable person 
would think demand actions that contradict the original rules. And the 
older the constitution, the more frequently these occasions will arise. 
Human intelligence and sensibility have distinct advantages over 
unchanging and insensate rules. Graber asserts that “[c]onstitutions are 
means for coordinating political activity, maintaining stable rule, fostering 
deliberative government, promoting national aspirations, and establishing 
                                                                                                                     
35 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 10 THE WORKS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). 
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compromises that enable people with different values to share the same 
civic space.” That’s an ambitious agenda and if achieving these 
“constitutional purposes” is the paramount objective, it is no surprise that 
the rules in a constitutional text, drafted at a discrete historical moment, 
will not be up to the job. Responding to this truth, Graber proposes 
supplementing the original rules with a judicial power to tweak them on an 
ongoing basis in light of evolving circumstances and values. 
My understanding of the purpose of constitutionalism is more modest. 
It aims to create the institutions and procedures of the state and to impose 
substantive limits on public power in a few especially sensitive areas of 
human activity. Faithfully adhered to, this project has the potential to 
secure some aspects of social life from unexpected interference. If a 
constitution is to succeed in this project, its rules must be reasonably 
long-lived, requiring that the permissible methods of changing the rules be 
difficult. This forecloses recognition of the kind of indefinite revising 
power that Graber foresees. “A constitution always being ‘adapt[ed] [. . .] 
to cope with current problems and current needs’ is no constitution at 
all.”36 Graber is right, of course, that, as things change, a fixed constitution 
will almost certainly become less suitable and will at some point become 
unsustainable. (The United States Constitution, now 230 years old may 
well have passed that point.) If we are determined to maintain the special 
benefits of constitutionalism, when that time comes, however, the better 
solution may be the creation of a new constitution. 
 Laurence Claus has laid out a case for the priority of public meaning 
interpretation that differs substantially from Scalia’s. His innovative 
argument follows from what he takes to be the most plausible reason for 
the normativity of the rules of the legal system. A legal system is a 
response to the need for “the shared expectations [that] are the only way 
we can live together in large groups, with people with whom we have no 
personal intimacy.” A constitution, or any other enacted law, is valuable 
only insofar as the members of the population subject to it are able to 
deduce a set of common rules that will allow them to coordinate their 
conduct. Enactments only become law as people conform to the texts’ rules 
and observe others doing the same. For Claus, this kind of mutual 
acknowledgment is the ultimate—and the sole—criterion for the creation 
of successful constitutions. Other facts, such as the substance of the rules 
or the political appeal of the process by which the rules were adopted, will 
make a difference “only to the extent they help inform people’s 
understanding of what others are likely to do and to expect.”37 
                                                                                                                     
36 Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 38 (2000) (quoting William J. 
Brennan, The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 
438 (1986)). 
37 Emphasis added. 
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This view resonates with Anglo-American common law systems where 
the law declared by courts was once understood to be a species of 
customary law. Matthew Hale said the rules of the common law “acquired 
their binding power . . . by a long and immemorial usage, and by the 
strength of custom . . . .”38 The common law judges, however, spent little 
time explaining how and why customary behavior acquired normative 
force. They do not seem to have explained its force as Claus does, that is 
by virtue of the fact that people will recognize its widespread adoption by 
fellow citizens and decide to adjust their own behavior in the same way. In 
any event, whatever the pre-modern adoption of custom as the basis of law 
might tell us must be less persuasive in our current intellectual 
environment, where all law—including common law—is regarded as “the 
articulate voice of some sovereign.”39 These days, that is, common law 
rules are regarded as a kind of judicial legislation. Looked at that way, it 
seems odd to insist that the legal quality of the resulting norms is unrelated 
to the identity or the conduct of the lawmaker.  
This incongruity is even more pronounced when we are dealing with 
rules created, in the first instance, as canonical text. If the only relevant 
aspect of valid law is the way it is understood in the regulated society, 
there is little to distinguish legislatively from judicially promulgated law. 
Yet, written constitutions devote much of their text to setting out the 
composition and procedures of legislatures whose enactments will be 
entitled to the status of law. Can it be that these directions are intended 
only to improve the chances that the statutes produced will commend 
themselves to the society as more likely to be widely embraced? Surely 
these restrictions on lawmaking are also motivated by a conviction that 
they embody the right ways to make law in a society in which certain 
political values prevail. The same factors are relevant in 
constitution-making, although the designation of the relevant constituent 
lawmakers and the proper procedures in that case will necessarily be 
defined by political rather than legal considerations. 
 In one sense, Claus’s explanation is undisputable: No rules can be 
effective if their “binding power” is not acknowledged by a substantial part 
of the subject society. And, by the same token, the adoption of such an 
attitude by enough people might alone justify us in calling such rules law. 
But of all the collections of people whose acts might turn out to be 
constitutions and of all the potential procedures for drafting and approving 
constitutional rules, only some people and only some procedures will end 
up as successes. It is common sense to infer that these people and these 
procedures were selected because there is something about them that 
                                                                                                                     
38 SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 23–24 (1792) (spelling has been 
modernized). 
39 S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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reflects the dominant values of the relevant time and place. When, 
therefore, we confront situations where the application of the resulting 
rules come into dispute, it will be natural to look at those actual 
law-making events and to consult the intentions held by those human 
beings who—in conformity with prevailing political values—achieved the 
status of successful law-makers.  
Larry Alexander’s essay deals explicitly with the essential connection 
between the two main themes of the symposium. As just discussed, the 
preferred approach to constitutional (and all other legal) interpretation is 
necessarily determined by assumptions about the basis of the law’s 
normative force. For positivists at least, the legal system incorporates a set 
of decisions made by certain human beings at certain times. If a written 
constitution is the highest law in a system, that status is definitionally a 
consequence of some of those historical decisions. Furthermore, since we 
are talking about the underlying basis of the legal system, and for reasons I 
have also summarized in some comments above, those decisions cannot 
themselves be the exercise of any powers granted by law. A successful 
constituent process must be a political development. In the case of the 
United States, the political principle that governed that process was the 
“sovereignty of the people.” What such sovereignty entailed was a 
complicated matter but the idea that the Constitution’s binding force stems 
from the authority of “the people” continues to shape our legal and 
political discourse. This conviction assumes that the state convention 
ratifications of 1787-1789 expressed “the people’s” will. An official 
interpreter who regards him or herself as faithfully serving the legal system 
that resulted from that act of the “people,” therefore, is obliged to respect 
the intentions held by those ratifiers when they created the Constitution. 
“Only originalism,” as Alexander says, “is authority preserving.” 
Alexander raises some perplexing issues associated with identification 
of legitimate constituent lawmakers. He understands those lawmakers to 
put in place something like H. L. A. Hart’s rule of recognition, a rule that I 
referred to in previous work as a system’s “pre-constitutional rule.” Hart 
thought this process involves the creation of a “standard[] of official 
behaviour” that was accepted by the legal system’s “officials.”40 It is in 
that connection that Alexander quotes my statement in a 1981 article that, 
in the United States, “it is the Supreme Court’s understanding of the [rule 
of recognition] that counts.” It is not always pleasant to be reminded of 
speculations from 40 years ago. In this case, Alexander points out some 
logical difficulties with my (and Hart’s) conclusion that one must identify 
the rule of recognition by reference to the behavior of legal institutions. 
The status of those institutions, arises from the legal system whose basis is 
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in issue, thus raising an obvious problem of circularity. Alexander, who 
like me basically agrees with Hart’s framework, insists that the necessary 
acceptance of a rule of recognition must instead be sought in “the attitudes 
and beliefs of a much wider population” than the system’s officials. Hart 
agreed with this approach when the legal system being examined was that 
of a simple society. In that situation, “the bulk of society . . . must 
generally share, accept or regard as binding the ultimate rule of recognition 
. . . .”41 The kind of acceptance necessary to support a pre-constitutional 
rule is also raised by James Allan in his contribution. Unlike Alexander, 
Allan contests the idea that the assent of the general population is a 
necessary element of a rule of recognition. If that were true, Hart’s analysis 
could not apply to many authoritarian states that are created and persist 
without popular approval.  
My own views, while not exactly well-defined, have evolved since 
1981. In a 2013 article, I suggested that fundamental legal change may 
“manifest[] itself, in acceptance of the new arrangements by the ‘officials’ 
of the system, but the reasons for that acceptance are likely to involve 
actions and opinions of many people, official and unofficial.”42 As the 
quotations above indicate, Hart, himself, failed to stipulate the 
preconditions for the creation of a pre-constitutional rule with much 
precision. As Allan makes clear, we are interested in the beliefs of the 
relevant group not because we think they have themselves exercised a 
constituent power but because their beliefs are evidence for one or another 
understanding of the nature of the legal system. If we conclude that some 
common proposition about legal authority is, in fact, not accepted by the 
officials of a community, we may infer that it does not really accurately 
describe the basic rules of the system. Such a misalignment between the 
rhetoric and behavior of officials, and what official behavior shows about 
the effective understanding of the proper sources of law, is a powerful 
indicator of impending constitutional change. The development of 
judicially enforced limitations on the powers of the Crown and Parliament 
in the United Kingdom, pointed out in my comments on Alison Young’s 
contribution, may be an example. 
This possible misalignment between formal rules and social and 
institutional understandings is pertinent to the questions Alexander raises 
in his conclusion. He refers to the fact that some observers have taken the 
simultaneous existence of different and incompatible theories of 
interpretation to mean that “we lack a single preconstitutional rule.” 
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According to these observers, we have “dueling preconstitutional rules 
each recognizing a somewhat different legal system . . . .” He finds this 
description implausible, at least in the context of the United States. 
American judges, after all, uniformly recognize an obligation to “adhere to 
the 1789 Constitution.” The idea that we can each conform to that 
Constitution in our own way misconceives what it means to interpret any 
text, especially a text understood to express the will of an accepted 
lawmaker. I am sympathetic to this point of view and I agree that the 
population in general accepts judicial constitutional “interpretations” only 
because they see them as good faith attempts “to apply the Constitution.” 
I do not think, however, that this logical argument accurately describes 
the effective legal system in the United States. As I have already 
mentioned in my comments on the essay of Aviam Soifer, the hard fact is 
that the behavior of our constitutional judges does not, in very substantial 
part, conform to the rules of the 1787-89 Constitution as amended. Those 
deviations are explained and defended by many—probably most—
academic commentators as premised on an understanding of law that does 
not require reference to the meaning of the text intended by the 
constitutional enactors. This explicit rejection of intended meaning, 
moreover, has been espoused by the judges themselves including justices 
of the United States Supreme Court. In a much-cited article, Justice 
William Brennan criticized those “who would restrict claims of right to the 
values of 1789 specifically articulated in the Constitution [and] turn a blind 
eye to social progress and eschew adaptation of overarching principles to 
changes of social circumstance.”43    
It is hard to see these facts as suggesting anything other than the 
existence of pre-constitutional rules other than one that directs us to the 
original meaning of the Constitution. My view, like Alexander’s, has been 
that adherence to the original intentions rule has the unique virtue of lining 
up with our continuing declarations of loyalty to “the Constitution.” By 
positing a set of fixed rules to govern important aspects of social relations, 
it also better fits the values of stability and predictability that are the 
hallmarks of constitutionalism. I recognize, however, that, taken seriously, 
this approach generates significant costs by tying society to the institutions 
and values of an increasingly alien time.44  
There is one lesson to be taken from a clear-eyed examination of the 
relationship between rules of recognition and the actual practice of 
constitutional adjudication, something confirmed by comparing a number 
of developed constitutional systems. Just as there will always be 
disagreement about the proper allocation of political power in the 
                                                                                                                     
43 Brennan, supra note 36, at 436. 
44 I rehearse this theme in my comments on the articles of Aviam Soifer and Mark Graber. See 
discussion supra pp. 1745–47, 1749–52. 
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organization of society, there will also be disagreement about the proper 
contents of the pre-constitutional rule. As Alexander accurately observes, 
“the content of the rule of recognition . . . is a complex, messy, difficult 
empirical question.” One place that these inevitable disagreements will be 
manifested is sure to be in the role and behavior of constitutional courts. 
James Allan’s contribution directly confronts the fact just mentioned—
that the application of constitutions in the United States and elsewhere, has 
turned out to depart significantly from the rules created in the constituent 
process. Instead, constitutional courts have distilled large political values 
from the supposedly controlling constitutions and then extended and 
elaborated those values in ways which cannot have been uniquely 
determined by the original rules. That practice is hard to reconcile with 
constitutionalism, which demands clear and stable rules defining the 
powers of the state. As I mentioned in my comments on Aviam Soifer’s 
contribution, this conclusion might persuade us that the project of an 
enforceable, written constitution is impractical and should be abandoned. 
That is, we might decide that in a working democracy, it makes more sense 
for the elected government to be left unconstrained by a judicial review 
that is, in truth, largely manufactured on an ad hoc basis by the judges. On 
the other hand, we might decide that leaving judicial review in place yields 
other benefits even if they do not include the benefits of a rule-bound state. 
Allan takes issue with my attempt, in a recent essay, to make the case 
for the latter alternative. I suggested that we might understand the judges to 
be discharging the function of the aristocracy in a classical “mixed 
government” and that such intervention might be more attractive than 
unlimited and thoroughly democratic public decision-making. In part, I 
based this possibility on modern scholarship that has raised doubts about 
the electorate’s ability to evaluate the stakes in public issues, as well as on 
the virtues of mixed government, as expounded by political theorists going 
back more than 2000 years. Allan contests some of the premises of this 
reasoning. He notes that unlike questions that turn on facts, the kinds of 
decisions made by constitutional courts simply depend on moral values, in 
the choosing of which the judges hold no particular advantage. It seems to 
me, however, that there is a difference between value preferences 
expressed by people who can and those who cannot appreciate the 
sometimes-complicated social context in which that choice and its 
consequences will play out. If so, there may be something to be said for 
some democratic decisions to be monitored by a body likely to take a more 
deliberate and longer-term view of the issues. 
Allan also notes that the limited transfer of authority from elected 
officials to life-tenured judges removes a critical element of accountability 
from the decision-making process. Democracy, he reminds us, “lets us 
‘throw the bums out.’” It is true that secure judicial tenure makes the 
judges less responsive to public opinion than legislators who must face the 
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voters at regular intervals. But in a mixed government, that is a feature not 
a bug. To the extent that mixed government has an attraction, it lies 
entirely in the better choices its advocates expect from a system in which 
the desires of the population are sometimes stymied by the judgment of a 
group of people who, we hope, may have cooler and wiser heads. For 
exactly the same reasons, it is of little moment that “you could never sell 
[mixed government] to people upfront and openly.” Whatever concerns we 
have about the unrestrained judgment of the people are not alleviated—
indeed they may be aggravated—if the same unconstrained people had to 
approve the allocation of power at the constituent stage of public 
decision-making.  
Our current system emerged when judges, charged with making the 
rules of a constitution effective, moved further and further away from the 
constitution-makers’ intentions. Over time—and especially in cases of 
long-surviving texts like that of the United States—the relative proportion 
of founders’ rules to judges’ preferences has radically diminished. As a 
result, the constitutionalist values of clear, stable, and predictable limits 
were compromised. To the degree, however, that the constitutional 
enterprise was directed at fear of the exercise of public power, this new 
situation has simply offered a different way of making that exercise safer. 
Even on this ground, however, I agree with Allan that handing this power 
to long-tenured judges makes for a very imperfect mixed government. 
Were we constructing such a body from scratch, we would be unlikely to 
staff it exclusively, as we do now, with successful, aging lawyers. As I said 
in the essay that Allan reviews: “Legal training will be useful in the 
resolution of many public issues, but so would expertise in science, 
philosophy, history, engineering, and many other fields.”45 The superiority 
of this judicial brand of mixed government to unrestrained parliamentary 
democracy, moreover, can be only relative. Our preference for one or 
another approach must depend on the history, traditions, economics, and 
demographics of the society where it is employed. 
Whatever our final judgment, a mixed government (in whatever form) 
need not be a pure oligarchy. The American founders were deeply devoted 
to the central role of popular opinion in the determination of public 
questions. Madison was typical when he declared that any government 
ought to “derive[] all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body 
of the people . . . .”46 This did not prevent those founders, however, from 
looking for ways to mitigate the dangers of such a republican constitution, 
dangers arising from many of the same problems with popular decision 
                                                                                                                     
45 Richard S. Kay, Democracy, Mixed Government and Judicial Review, in LAW UNDER A 
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY 199, 223 (Lisa Burton 
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46 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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making that modern scholars have documented. So, Madison worried that 
the people might sometimes be “stimulated by some irregular passion, or 
some illicit advantage” and that to guard against that risk it would be wise 
to install “some temperate and respectable body of citizens” to delay their 
actions.47 Madison was thinking of the Senate but that body has changed in 
both selection and behavior. If we, nonetheless, continue to be troubled by 
the dangers of unlimited popular government, and if we further decide that 
the constitutional rule of law has ceased to restrain, the interposition of the 
judges might not be our worst alternative. 
Michael Perry’s characteristically meticulous argument sets out and 
applies a somewhat different model of constitutional interpretation. For a 
many constitutional questions, Perry adopts an originalist perspective. In 
deciding whether a norm “truly is a constitutional norm” and therefore 
eligible to invalidate a government action, he argues that it is necessary to 
inquire whether or not that norm was either entrenched by the 
constitutional enactors or is an “unescapable inference” from the structure 
of government that those enactors established in the constitution. This is 
perfectly consistent with the originalist idea that constitutional rules must 
be interpreted in the sense that those rules were understood by the 
constitution-makers. But there is more to Perry’s scheme. 
First, under his “General Rule,” a court must turn down a 
constitutional claim if it concludes that it is “at least reasonable that the 
norm [on which the claim is based] is not a constitutional norm.” That is, 
even in a case where, according to a court’s own best estimate, the norm 
cited was entrenched by the enactors, the claim will fail so long as the 
proponent’s erroneous judgment on the rule’s status, is still “reasonable.” 
In such a case the constitution (as interpreted according to the judge’s best 
understanding) is subordinated to a general rule of deference to the 
political authorities even though such deference itself was not entrenched 
by the constitution-makers. This General Rule is justified not by historical 
proof but as an attempt to bring constitutional law into “closer alignment 
with the morality of human rights,” as manifested in international human 
rights instruments. That morality includes as an essential principle, the 
right to democratic governance, thus favoring the judgment of the elected 
branches. 
Second, even claims that would be rejected under the General Rule just 
mentioned should be cognizable by the Supreme Court if the constitutional 
rule on which they are based is “part of the morality of human rights.” In 
such a case, the asserted norm should be treated as having true 
constitutional status as long as it is reasonable to think it was established 
by the constitution-makers. Like the General Rule, this exception is not 
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itself tied to any choice made or even argued to have been made by the 
historical enactors. Once more, it calls for judicial decisions that will 
depart from the judges’ best understanding of the results of the 
constitution-making process. Here, again, the deviation from the best 
estimate of the original rules is premised on the value of aligning United 
States constitutional law with international human rights.  
Compared to purely originalist interpretation, which is confined to an 
examination of the reach of the constitutional rules created by the 
constitutional enactors, the procedure prescribed by Perry permits—and 
sometimes seems to require—a different method of decision making. It 
places much weight on the capacity to determine if certain claims are 
“reasonable.” That test, which is critical to application of both the General 
Rule and its exception, may be expected to yield different results even 
when conscientiously applied by different judges. Furthermore, when, in 
deciding whether the exception to the General Rule applies, an interpreter 
makes a judgment about a norm’s inclusion among the rules constituting 
the “morality of human rights,” the uncertainty is multiplied. Perry relies 
on international human rights treaties for evidence of the contents of this 
morality. Those treaties, however, are at least as vague as the United States 
Constitution. And if these rights are to be understood as they have been 
construed by international courts or other agencies charged with 
interpreting them, a large, complicated, and sometimes contradictory body 
of norms will provide room for further disagreement. 
A similar problem besets a third criterion offered by Perry for treating 
a norm as constitutional—if it is a “bedrock feature of the constitutional 
law of the United States.” This quality is recognized in norms “so 
embedded in the life of the nation, so accepted by the society, so 
fundamental to the private and public expectations of individuals and 
institutions’ that SCOTUS should and almost certainly will continue to 
deem [the norm] constitutionally authoritative even if it is open to serious 
question whether enactors ever entrenched [the norm] in the Constitution.” 
The difficulty with this criterion is not that there are no uncontroversial 
principles which meet it; the norm against racial segregation, for example, 
appears to satisfy it. It is rather that there is a case to be made for many 
other more controversial doctrines. It introduces, that is, a distinctly open 
texture into constitutional adjudication. Perry’s example of a bedrock right 
to engage in conduct dictated by “moral choices rooted in and nourished by 
one or another nontheistic worldview” is exemplary. And the uncertainty 
of such a right is multiplied when (combined with a right to act in 
accordance with one’s religious beliefs) it morphs into an even more 
general “right of privacy.” 
These features of Michael Perry’s approach to the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions creating individual rights, therefore, seem 
problematic insofar as they allow or even invite recourse to broad and 
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contestable standards. And once an interpreter concludes that an instance 
of conduct is prima facie protected by a qualifying constitutional norm, he 
or she must confront the fact that the right so identified will probably be 
“only conditional.” Taking a cue from the structure of rights protection in 
various human rights treaties, as well as in many modern national 
constitutions, Perry argues that interferences with protected rights will not 
amount to constitutional violations if the state’s action is for a legitimate 
purpose (such as “public safety, order, health or morals”), if there is no less 
rights-impacting way of achieving that objective, and the public benefit of 
the interference with rights is greater than the cost suffered by the affected 
rights-holder. Clearly, for controversial modern cases—some of which 
Perry examines—this examination without more is unlikely to yield a 
determinate result even when conducted by dispassionate, intelligent 
judges acting in perfect good faith. Indeed, the kinds of factors that would 
be considered in this exercise are hard to distinguish from those that went 
into the legislative process, the product of which is challenged in the 
constitutional litigation. 
The process that Perry describes is powerfully attractive in many ways. 
Insofar as it foresees a legal system monitored by judges committed to a 
morality of human rights, it promotes a society in which the dignity of each 
individual is a prominent consideration in all collective decisions. For the 
reasons discussed, however, this model fails to deliver fixed limits on 
public action that guarantee a safe haven for some kinds of human activity. 
It is, therefore, a system with a constitution but, in its operation, it may fall 
short in promoting essential features of constitutionalism.   
*** 
Finally, I can do no more than express my gratitude to my colleague, 
Richard Pomp, for the kind and generous things he has said about me and 
about our relationship in his contribution to the Symposium. I am sure I 
possess only a small part of the virtue that he awards me. I am in his debt 
for his collegiality, his intellectual support and, most of all, for the warm 
friendship we have shared for more than forty years.  
 
